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Abbreviation list
   
EU European union
Para. Paragraph
RÅ Reports from the Supreme Administrative Court
SFS The Swedish Code of Statutes
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RiR Swedish general auditors
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background
The purpose of double tax conventions is to eliminate double taxation in
cross  border  activities.1 Thus,  such  cross  border  activities  and  the
application of double tax convention can be arraged in a way that no state
will  tax the activity.  This is  so called double  non-taxation.  Double  non-
taxation  of  cross-border  economic  activities  may  be  an  intended  or
unintended consequence of the simultaneous application of national tax law
of two or more states.  Double non-taxation could also be a result  of the
application of tax convention. To eliminate double non-taxation some states
have  introduced  anti-avoidance  provisions  and  provisions  against  treaty
shopping in their double tax conventions.
There are different ways to tackle the problem with double non-taxation that
occurs from double tax conventions. One example on how to avoid double
non-taxation  is  to  include  a  subject-to-tax  clause  in  a  double  tax
convention.2 A subject-to-tax  clause  means  that  a  contracting  state  can
reclaim its taxing right when the other state does not make use of its taxing
rights allocated to them by the provision of a treaty.3 A subject-to-tax clause
guarantees that for a benefit to be granted under the agreement, a tax must
be paid on the current income in the other State. Subject-to-tax clauses is a
general  method,  especially  when  it  is  in  the  method  article,  to  prevent
double  non  taxation.  Sweden  has  entered  a  number  of  double  tax
conventions with several states and my aim for this thesis is to investigate if
the subject-to-tax clauses exist in double tax conventions that Sweden has
entered into between 2004 and 2014.
In 2010, the Swedish  general auditors4 criticised the Swedish government
for lack of maintenance of the Swedish double tax convention network. To
summarise, they said that Sweden had to improve and work for signing new
double tax conventions and to update older versions. They also held that
Sweden  has  to  be  better  in  the  area,  especially  when  it  comes  to  the
competitiveness. The general auditors argued that Sweden’s competitiveness
deteriorated compared to other states having more favourable agreements.
One reason to why Sweden has slowed down the number of negotiations on
tax  convention  the  last  years  is  that  the  government  since  2006  has
prioritised  to  sign  information  exchange  agreements  with  so  called  tax
heavens.5
Juridical  double  taxation  and  double  non-taxation  occur  when  taxpayers
1 Para. 7 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention. Hilling, Maria, 
National report – Sweden, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double non 
taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 655
2 One example that contains a subject-to-tax clause are the double tax convention 
between the nordic states, article 26(5)
3 Scapa, Anna & Heine, Lars A, Avoidance of double non-taxation under the OECD 
model tax convention, Intertax, 2005 page 277
4 Riksrevisorerna
5 RiR 2010:24 page 72
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trade or invest across borders. Since the cross border activity has increased
the recent years, about double taxation and double non-taxation has become
a  phenomenon  that  has  increased  also.6 In  the  European  Commission’s
report from 2012, it is stated that most of the double non-taxation cases arise
from mismatches between states qualification of hybrid entities and hybrid
financial  instrument.  They also  found it  common that  the  application  of
double tax conventions led to double non-taxation.7  
The  new  global  economic  reality  and  globalisation  have  led  corporate
entities to adopt new business forms and the financial market has radically
changes in the last 30 years.8 The intersection of foreign and domestic tax
systems and the growing network of double tax conventions have increased
opportunities for tax avoidance.9 The avoidance of tax is a problem for any
tax system. The need for anti avoidance rule in double tax convention is
especially needed in those cases where national anti-avoidance rules are not
capable of dealing with the problem.10 Subject-to-tax clauses are a sort of
anti-avoidance rule since they are dealing with the problem that arise when
none of the states are taxing the income, for example in the case of hybrid
instrument.
1.2 Aim
Focus of my thesis is to what extent subject-to-tax clauses exist in Swedish
double tax conventions. The Swedish finance ministry has designed a model
for Swedish double tax conventions that is used when Sweden is entering a
negotiation with another state. In that model there is a subject-to-tax clause
in  article  21(5)  about  capital.  For  that  reason,  I  presume  that  it  is  an
intention from the government of Sweden to have subject-to-tax clauses in
their double tax conventions. I will in this thesis investigate to what extent
subject-to-tax  clauses  are  included  in  double  tax  conventions  concluded
between  the  years  2004  to  2014. I  will  go  through  some  of  the  most
common situations when double non-taxation arises and how they could be
tackled. 
After that, I will se if there is any loopholes in the investigated double tax
conventions thorough the allocation articles that could result in double non-
taxation. I will also examine if there is any allocation articles that give the
exclusive right to tax to one of the contracting states. If the right to tax is
given  exclusive  to  one  state  and  if  that  state  does  not  tax  the  income
according to domestic tax law, double non-taxation is a fact. It is important
6 European Commission, Summary report of the responses received on the public 
consultation on factual examples and possible way to tackle double non-taxation 
(TAXUD D1 D(2012)) page 2
7 European Commission, Summary report of the responses received on the public 
consultation on factual examples and possible way to tackle double non-taxation 
(TAXUD D1 D(2012)) page 3
8 Ramon Tomazela Santos, Tax treaty qualification of income derived from hybrid 
financial instrument, Bulletin for international taxation, 2013, vol 67 no. 10, section 1
9 Arnold, Brian J, Tax treaties and tax avoidance: the 2003 revisions to the commentary 
to the OECD model, Bulletin for international taxation, 2004, page 244
10 Arnold, Brian J, Tax treaties and tax avoidance: the 2003 revisions to the commentary 
to the OECD model, Bulletin for international taxation, 2004, page 255
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here to  notice that I will only see to what extent there may be gaps for
double non-taxation, and my purpose is not to find absolute situations when
double non taxation arises. I will also se to what extent double non-taxation
could be solved by the convention itself through interpretation of articles
and domestic law. Lastly, I will examine if subject-to-tax clauses is a good
tool to avoid double non-taxation in cross-border activities.
 
1.3 Method and material
I use a traditional legal method and I originate from how the law stands
today. I will go through new double tax conventions concluded by Sweden
between 2004 and 2014.11 I will also investigate new protocols to existing
double tax conventions from the same time period. I will use sources such
as doctrine, OECD model tax convention and reports from OECD and the
European Commission. I am using the OECD model tax convention and the
commentaries from 2010.   
Some of the doctrine is dated before 2010. The version of OECD that I use
is  from 2010, which  I  have taken into  consideration during the working
process by ensuring that it is still consistent with the legal situation of today.
I have limited my selection to materials  in English and Swedish. All the
double tax conventions that I have been using for my thesis are available in
English on the IBFD tax research platform database.12  
To attain my aim, I have used sign double tax conventions. By sign double
tax conventions it is meant both agreements that are in force and those that
are not. When a double tax convention is not in force I will point it out to
the reader. I have chosen the time limit for signing the convention because
that is when they are published and when they become official documents.
Between the years  2004 and 2014 I  have found 11 new signed Swedish
double  tax  conventions. When  referring  to  the  Swedish  model  tax
convention I am using the version from 2007.13 Furthermore, I have taken in
to consideration material until the 1st of May 2014.   
1.4 Delimitation
My thesis focuses on the situations when both the contracting states assign
the  same  situation  to  one  and  the  same  taxpayer.  I  will  not  deal  with
economic double taxation, I will instead focus on when double non-taxation
arises  from  direct  taxation.  Further,  my  work  will  not  deal  with  the
interpretation of double tax convention and what weight should be given to
the commentaries and changes in the OECD Model tax convention after a
double  tax  convention  is  in  force.  My  thesis  will  not  deal  with  the
relationship between double tax conventions and EU law.
11 For study on subject-to-tax clauses in Swedish double tax conventions before 2004, se 
Hilling, Maria, National report – Sweden, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, 
double non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 655 - 676
12 www.ibfd.org
13 Since its not a official document, I only have access to that version. I have tried to 
contact the finance ministry without any replay if their is a newer version.
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I will not make any distinction between legal and natural person if it’s not
specifically mentioned in the context. With double non taxation it is meant
that either the source state or the resident state taxes the economic activity.
For my investigation I have chosen to limit it to subject to-tax-clauses in
Swedish  tax  conventions  but  some  reference  are  made  to  double  tax
convention concluded between other states.
I  will  not  dealt  with  timing issues.14 Since  Sweden is  a  member  of  the
OECD  I  will  only  look  at  the  OECD  model  tax  convention  and
commentaries and not at the UN model tax convention. I will not discuss the
Vienna convention and its relationship to double tax conventions.   
In section 4.3 and annex 1, I present in what extent the allocation articles
conclude on later years can be a loophole for double non-taxation. My aim
is only to point out the risk of double non-taxation even thru the double tax
conventions in themselves are so called credit conventions. I will show that
there still is a risk for double non-taxation by the  allocation articles. This is
only  an theory and is  not  an exhaustive accounting of  exactly  in  which
situations double non-taxation could occur. My thesis does not deal with the
other contracting states domestic tax law.   
When it comes to Swedish case law, I have delimited my thesis to three
cases,  one  from  2004  and  one  from  1987  that  discuses  subject-to-tax
clauses. A third case will be discussed from 1996 that concerns the criteria
liable to tax. In this thesis, I will discuss the liable to tax criteria from a
Swedish  perspective  because  the  thesis  is  based  on Swedish  double  tax
conventions.
I  have  excluded  exchange  information  agreements  and  social  security
agreements in my investigation. My purpose is not to make an exhaustive
list of the types of procedure used to obtain double non-taxation, but my aim
is only to give an introduction to the most common situations when double
non-taxation arises and how it could be tackled. My work will not deal with
the difference between tax avoidance and tax fraud.
  
1.5 Outline
I start my thesis by giving the reader an introduction to the law of double tax
conventions in chapter 2. In the end of chapter 2 I will briefly discuss abuse
of double tax conventions. Chapter 3 will explain some of the most common
situations  where  double  non-taxation  can  arise  and  provisions  that  are
addressed to prevent double non-taxation. In chapter 4 I will focus on what
extent  subject-to-tax  clauses  exist  in  Swedish  double  tax  conventions.
Chapter 5 will finish the thesis whit some concluding remarks. 
14 For more information about timing issues, se for example David Kleist chapter 4.3.3 
and OECD, Report on hybrid mismatch arrangements: tax policy and compliance 
issues, 2012, chapter 6.4
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2. Double tax conventions  
2.1 Introduction to double tax conventions
In a case of cross border activity there is a risk that the economic activity is
taxable in more than one state. That could have devastating consequences
for the taxpayer, especially if the two states concerned have a high tax rate.
The goal with double tax conventions is to avoid double taxation and to
promote  exchanges  of  goods  and  services,  facilitate  free  movement  of
capital and persons by removing obstacles such as double taxation.15 In light
of  the  main  purpose  of  the  OECD model  tax  convention,  avoidance  of
double non-taxation may also be seen as a way to promote fair competition
and reduce distortions in the market.16
A double tax convention can only limit the right to tax and never extend it.17
It can only prevent double taxation within its scope of application. For a
double tax convention to  be applicable,  the person concerned must  be a
resident in one or both of the contracting states according to article 1 OECD
model  tax  convention  and the  taxes  must  be  covered by the  convention
according to article 2. OECD model tax convention does not cover cases of
double taxation other than the taxes covered and listed in article 2.18
Furthermore,  a  double  tax  convention  is  only  applicable  if  the  person
concerned is  liable  to tax19 according to  domestic  law in the contracting
states. The criteria liable to tax are found in article 4(1) in OECD model tax
convention. For a state to be able to tax a income it must have the right to do
so under their domestic laws. If it has the right to tax the income because of
its domestic law, the next step is the double tax convention between the two
states.  The  situation  with  double  taxation  arises  when  one  or  both
contracting states claims that  the person concerned is  a  resident  in  their
territory  under  domestic  law.20 This  is  when  the  taxpayer  has  full  tax
liability. One example below will explain the situation:
Adam has his permanent home in state A where he lives and works. State A
considers him to be a resident in state A and he is fully liable to tax there.
Thus, during his work he has to stay for more than six months in state B.
According to the domestic law in state B, because he stays there for more
than six months he is taxed as a resident. In this situation, both state A and
B claims that he is fully liable to tax within their territory according to their
domestic laws. This conflict can be solved under a double tax convention
between state A and B.     
The double tax convention between state A and B determines in which state
15 Para. 7 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention
16 Para. 7 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention
17 Hilling, Maria, National report – Sweden, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, 
double non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 657
18 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 79
19 The  criteria liable to tax will be will be discussed deeper in section 3.3.1.2
20 Para. 2 of the commentary on article 4 OECD model tax convention
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Adam  is  a  resident  under  the  convention.  In  the  OECD  model  tax
convention we find the criteria for residence in article 4. When a natural or
legal person is subject only to limited taxation in a state, he is not a resident
in that state, according to the OECD model tax convention. When the person
concerned  has  limited  tax  liability  in  both  contracting  states,  he  is  not
covered by the double tax convention and does not classify as a resident in
the meaning of a double tax convention.21
Double tax convention deals with juridical double taxation22 and it is when
two states under their domestic laws allocate the right to tax an economic
activity to one taxpayer. Economic double taxation is not covered by OECD
model  tax  convention;  economic  double  taxation  is  taxation  of  different
taxpayers in respect of the same subject.23 The application of a double tax
convention depends on both the uniform interpretation of its provision and
the  uniform  qualification  of  the  income.  Interpretation  of  provisions
addresses to the conventions rule and the qualification of income refers to
the knowledge of the fact in the specific case.24
The allocation articles are found in 6-22 in the OECD model tax convention.
Allocation articles provide limitations on taxing rights of the source state.
Also some allocation rules, for example dividends, state that the source state
only can tax up to a certain rate.25 In some cases, the allocation article states
that the income “shall be taxable only in the other state.” In those cases, the
allocation article gives the excluding right to tax to one state.26 If it is stated
in a allocation article that the source state “may tax the income” the resident
state is  allowed to tax the income as well  if  the income is taxable there
according  to  domestic  law.27 The  allocation  articles  do  not  ensure  that
double  taxation  is  avoided.28 It  is  the  resident  state  that  shall  apply  the
method  articles  to  eliminate  double  taxation  that  remains  after  the
application of the allocation Articles.29
The method articles only deal with double juridical taxation.30 In the OECD
model tax convention, the method articles are found in article 23A and 23B.
There  are  two  kinds  of  method  articles,  exempt  and  credit.  The  big
difference between the two methods are that the exemption method takes
21 Vogel, Klas, On double tax conventions, Kluwer law international. London 1997, page 
93
22 Kleist, David, Methods for elimination of double taxation under double tax treaties – 
with  particular reference to the application of double tax treaties in Sweden, Iustus, 
Uppsla 2012, page 125
23 Kleist, David, Methods for elimination of double taxation under double tax treaties – 
with particular reference to the application of double tax treaties in Sweden, Iustus, 
Uppsla 2012, page 126
24 Ramon Tomazela Santos, Tax treaty qualification of income derived from hybrid 
financial instrument, Bulletin for international taxation, 2013, vol 67 no. 10, section 2
25 Lang, Michael, Introduction to the law of double tax conventions, Linde, Amsterdam 
2010, page 67
26 Lang,  Michael, Introduction to the law of double tax conventions, Linde, Amsterdam 
2010, page 68
27 Dahlberg, Mattias, Internationell beskattning, Studentliteratur, Lund 2012, page 264
28 Lang, Michael, Introduction to the law of double tax conventions, Linde, Amsterdam 
2010, page 67
29 Dahlberg, Mattias, Internationell beskattning, Studentliteratur, Lund 2012, page 289
30 Para. 1 of the commentary on article 23 OECD model tax convention
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into accound that tax is paid in another contracting state. The credit method
takes in to consideration the rate on the tax paid in the other contracting
state.31 In the OECD model, article 23A is the exempt method and article
23B is the credit method.
The method articles are addressed to the resident state32 and it is up to the
contracting states to  choose  which method they prefer.  Some states also
have a combined method article, for example the exemption method with a
subject-to-tax  clause  or  an  exempt  method  with  a  switch  over  clause.33
Sweden primarily uses the credit method in their double tax conventions. In
some Swedish double tax conventions there is no regular method article.
Instead reference is  made to domestic Swedish law,  Swedish foreign tax
credit act34 which is similar to the credit method. In the Swedish double tax
conventions that have been examined for this thesis, I have found reference
to Swedish law in all of the 11 investigated conventions. In the convention
between Sweden and Isle of Man for example, article 11.2(A) stands that:
“Where a resident of Sweden derives income which under the laws of the
Isle of Man and in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement may be
taxed in the Isle of Man, Sweden shall allow - subject to the provisions of
the laws of Sweden concerning credit for foreign tax (as it may be amended
from time to  time without  changing the  general  principle  hereof)  -  as  a
deduction from the tax on such income, an amount equal to the Manx tax
paid in respect of such income.”
When the credit method is used, the case of double non taxation is generally
less frequent than within the exemption method.35 But, the credit method is
no  guarantee  to  secure  that  double  non-taxation  does  not  arise  from  a
convention. A double tax convention may use the credit method in order to
eliminate double taxation that still exist after the allocation articles, but if
there  is  no  double  taxation  to  eliminate,  the  method  articles  are  not
applicable. The allocation article can in itself result in double non-taxation.
For example, when an allocation article gives the exclusive right to tax to
state B, but state B does not tax the income according to domestic law. State
A does  not  have  any right  to  tax  the  income because  of  the double tax
convention.  In  those  cases,  there  is  no  double  taxation,  and  the  method
articles are not applicable. Still, there is a double non-taxation situation.    
When  the  exemption  method  is  used,  the  resident  state  is  obligated  to
exempt the income regardless of whether or not the source state actually
subjects the income to tax, if another solution is not expressly proved by the
double tax convention. When both states in fact do not impose tax under its
domestic  laws,  the  double  tax  convention  could  result  in  double  non-
31 Para. 17 of the commentary on article 23 OECD model tax convention
32 Lang 2010 page 121, paragraph 8 in the commentaries to article 23 OECD model tax 
convention
33 Lang, Michael, Introduction to the law of double tax conventions, Linde, Amsterdam 
2010, page 40
34 Avräkningslagem SFS 1986:468
35 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 83
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taxation.36 The exemption method by itself could in that situation lead to
double non-taxation when the source state has taxing rights under the treaty
but does not levy any tax under its domestic law and the resident state does
not  have any taxing rights. In  that  case,  it  is  reasonable to  combine  the
method article with a general subject-to-tax clause in order to avoid double
non-taxation.37 The aim of using the exemption method is to ensure neutral
competition in the source state.38   
If the credit method is used it is guaranteed that the foreign income is taxed
at the same rate that it should be if it was taxed in the resident state. Thus,
this  assumes  that  there  is  a  double  taxation  left  to  remove  after  the
application of the allocation articles.  The method articles are addressed to
the resident state.  According to  Lang, the best  way to avoid double non
taxation is  to  apply the credit  method,39 but  according to  what  has been
shown above, double non-taxation can still arise even if the credit method is
used in the method article, since double non-taxation still can arise from the
application of the allocation articles.     
2.2 Abuse of double tax conventions
In the commentary to article 1 in the OECD model, the committee on fiscal
affairs makes two statements. The first one is that double tax convention
increases  the  risk  of  abuse  by  facilitating  the  use  of  artificial  legal
constructions  aimed  at  securing  the  benefits  of  both  the  tax  advantages
available under certain domestic laws and the reliefs from tax provided for
in double taxation conventions.40 Second, it is agreed that States do not have
to  grant  the  benefits  of  a  double  tax  convention  where  arrangements
constitute  an  abuse  of  the  provisions  in  the  convention  that  has  been
entered.41 At the same time, they point out that it should not be assumed that
a  taxpayer  is  entering  a  double  tax convention  only  to  abuse  and  get  a
benefit  under  the  convention.42 Some  conventions  state  the  aim  of  the
double tax convention and describe when a benefit  may be denied.  One
example  is  the convention  between Chile  and Sweden from 2004 where
article 28.5 stands as follow:
“Considering that the main aim of the Convention is to avoid international
double  taxation,  the  Contracting  States  agree  that,  in  the  event  the
provisions  of  the  Convention  are  used  in  such  a  manner  as  to  provide
benefits not contemplated or not intended, the competent authorities of the
Contracting States shall in an expeditious manner, consult according to the
36 Kleist, David, Methods for elimination of double taxation under double tax treaties – 
with particular reference to the application of double tax treaties in Sweden, Iustus, 
Uppsla 2012, page 176
37 Burgstaller, Eva & Schilcher, Michael, Subject-to-tax clauses in tax treaties, European 
taxation, 2004, page 275
38 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 104
39 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 105
40 Para. 8 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention
41 Para. 9.4 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention
42 Para. 9.5 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention
11
mutual  agreement  procedure  of  Article  25 with  a  view to  amending the
Convention, where necessary.”
The  committee  on  fiscal  affairs  says  that  where  specific  avoidance
techniques have been identified in relation between two contracting states, it
will be useful to add specific provisions in the convention that are directly
addressed to the avoidance strategy that are frequently used.43 They also
point out the need that, in some cases, refuse claims to benefits from the
double tax convention under specific  circumstances,  for example when a
subsidiary is established in a tax heaven state.44 Such provision is called
“limitation on benefits” and is frequently used by the United States in their
double tax conventions. Even some Swedish double tax conventions include
limitation on benefit clauses. In the studied Swedish double tax conventions
I  have  found  limitation  on  benefit  clauses  in  relation  to  two  states,  the
convention with Poland45 from 2004 and the one with Georgia46 from 2013.
Lang points out in a general report on the subject double non-taxation  from
2004 that when a contracting state used the credit method they found it less
necessary to introduce special provisions for the prevention of double non
taxation.47 Thus,  some states  see  a  need for  a  special  provision  only  in
relation to certain states. One example is Luxembourg, where several double
tax  conventions  concluded  with  Luxembourg,  even  Sweden,48 exclude
holding companies from the scope of application of the DTC.49 In paragraph
9.5 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention there is a so
called guidelining principle. The commentary says that a benefit of a double
tax convention should not be available where the main purpose for entering
into certain transactions or arrangements is to secure a more favourable tax
position and to obtain a more favourable treatment in these circumstances
would  be  contrary  to  the  object  and  purpose  of  the  relevant  provisions.
However, this is a difficult problem relating to the burden of proof and this
falls outside the scope of my thesis, but it is an interesting statement from
OECD. The main reason with tax planning I should say is to get a benefit
and a lower tax burden for the taxpayer.  Some states treat abuse of double
tax convention as an abuse of domestic law because it is domestic provision
that creates tax liability. Other states treat abuse of a double tax convention
as an abuse of the tax convention itself.50 In the doctrine there are different
opinions on how to respond to a double tax convention if domestic law is
changed after the convention has been concluded. It would be possible to
take back tax claim by changes in the domestic law. A state that is acting
like that could be guilty to treaty override.51
43 Para. 9.6 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention
44 Para. 10.1 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention
45 Article 27
46 Article 26
47 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 103
48 Protocol para. 1, DTC between Sweden and Luxembourg SFS 1996:1510
49 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 106
50 Lang, Michael, Introduction to the law of double tax conventions, Linde, Amsterdam 
2010, page 62
51 Naumburg, Caroline, Subject to tax artiklar I DBA, Skattenytt, 2001, page 34
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3. Double non-taxation
3.1 Generally about double non-taxation
Double non-taxation can be split into two categories. The first one is the
intentional double non-taxation.52 This is when the state has the intention
not to tax the income. The reason for this could for example be income from
teachers, research and students. The aim of this is to stimulate the exchange
of knowledge across borders.53 Another example is tax heavens that have
the intention to attract foreign investors. It is in other words the intention
from  the  state  that  the  income  should  not  be  taxed.  The  other  one  is
unintentional double non-taxation. It is when the taxpayer, not the state, has
the  intention  to  avoid  tax.54 In  European  Commission’s  report,  one
contributor means that it  is also important to make a distinction between
actual  double  non-taxation  cases  such  as  hybrid  mismatches  and  tax
competition which refer to low taxation in a state.55 
However, since the EU law gives the taxpayer a broad right to arrange their
economic activity in a manner that taxes are minimised; double non-taxation
could  be  the  result.  Marjaana  Helminen56 means  that  since  double  non-
taxation is not in the interest of EU, it is important for the states to conclude
double  tax  conventions  to  avoid  double  non-taxation  situations.  It  is
important especially from that point of view that unintended double non-
taxation jeopardises the financing of the state budgets of the EU Member
States.  The  European  Commission’s  says  that  when  a  Member  State  is
concluding a double tax convention with other EU member states or with
states outside EU, they should include a provision to resolve a specifically
identified type of double non-taxation. The Commission recommends the
use of a general anti-abuse rule  in double tax conventions.57 OECD also
recommends their members to include specific provisions against common
arrangements. European Commission also suggest the way that Brazil has
dealt  with  situations  with  double  non-taxation  occurs  when  interest  or
royalties  are  going  to  low  tax  jurisdiction.  In  those  cases,  a  higher
withholding tax rate is applied.58 
52 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 82
53 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 82
54 Scapa, Anna & Heine, Lars A, Avoidance of double non-taxation under the OECD 
model tax convention, Intertax, 2005 page 266
55 European Commission, Summary report of the responses received on the public 
consultation on factual examples and possible way to tackle double non-taxation 
(TAXUD D1 D(2012)) page 8
56  Helminen, Marjaana, The problem of double non-taxation in the European Union – to 
what extent could this be resolved througt a multilateral EU tax treaty based on the 
nordic convention?, European taxation, 2013, page 308
57 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
parliament and the council - An action plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud 
and tax evasion, Brussels, COM(2012) 722 final, page 6
58  European Commission, Summary report of the responses received on the public 
consultation on factual examples and possible way to tackle double non-taxation 
(TAXUD D1 D(2012)) page 20
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European Commission stress out the fact that national anti-abuse rules often
are not fully effective, especially when it concerns cross-border situations
with many tax planning structures.59 
Double non-taxation may have different reasons to why they occur. Below I
will  go  through  some  of  the  most  common  arrangements.  Double  non-
taxation that arises from the exempt method has been mentioned above and
in  this  chapter  I  will  also  go  through  how  OECD  recommends  their
members to tackle the problem.
3.2  Conflict  of  qualification;  partnership  and  hybrid
-------financial instrument
In this  section I will  present  some of the most  common situations when
double  non-taxation  occurs  from  differences  in  domestic  law  or  from
different  interpretation  of  double  tax  conventions.  Both  concepts  have
resulted  in  two  reports  from  OECD,  the  first  one  is  on  the  subject
partnerships  from  1999  and  the  second  one  is  on  hybrid  mismatch
arrangements  from  2012.  The  consequences  of  the  interpretation  and
qualification conflicts are relevant from the point of view that the may lead
to double  non-taxation (negative conflict)  or to double taxation (positive
conflict)60
Conflict  of  qualification  can  concern  two  main  issues,  the  first  one  is
qualification of partnerships and the other one is qualification of different
types of  hybrid financial  instruments.  When it  concerns  qualification for
partnership,  the main issue is  how to treat  a  partnership for tax purpose
when two contracting states classify the partnership differently because of
domestic  law.  A partnership  could  be  classified  as  either  transparent  or
opaque for tax purpose. When two states classify a partnership, according to
domestic law or different categories in the double tax convention, it could
result in double non-taxation.  
David  Kleist  raises  the  issue  with  subject  identity  in  relation  to  hybrid
arrangements.  With  subject  identity  he  means  that  for  a  double  tax
convention to be applicable and for it to provide a solution, the tax must be
imposed on the same taxpayer.61 He means that in a conflict of qualification
situation, it could be argued that tax is not imposed to the same taxpayer
when one contracting state taxes the owner and the other contracting state
taxes the entity.   
OECD has found that a number of difficulties relating to the application of
tax  conventions  to  partnerships  fall  in  the  broader  category  of  so-called
"conflicts  of  qualification",  where  the  residence  and source  States  apply
59 European Commission, COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 6.12.2012 on 
aggressive tax planning, Brussels, 6.12.2012 C(2012) 8806 final, page 2
60 Ramon Tomazela Santos, Tax treaty qualification of income derived from hybrid 
financial instrument, Bulletin for international taxation, 2013, vol 67 no. 10, section 2
61 Kleist, David, Methods for elimination of double taxation under double tax treaties – 
with  particular reference to the application of double tax treaties in Sweden, Iustus, 
Uppsla 2012, page 126
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different  articles  of  the  Convention  on  the  basis  of  differences  in  their
domestic law.62 One example below will describe a situation when double
non-taxation  can  arise  from  qualification  conflicts  connected  to
partnerships:
A partnership has its source state in state A. State A does not tax the income
because it is state B, the resident state that has the right to tax according to
the  double  tax  convention.  State  B  does  not  tax  the  income  because  of
domestic law in state B, the partnership is classified as transparent for tax
purpose in state B.
OECD points  out  that  a  common  difficulty  is  that  some  countries  treat
partnerships as transparent entities and imposing no tax on the partnership
itself but instead tax the owners of the partnership. Some other states treat
partnership as a taxable entity which means that the partnership is taxed on
its income  as if it were a company.63 Furthermore, OECD means that this
type of conflict could be solved under article 23A(4) but that it requires that
the double tax convention contains the exempt method. I will describe the
article in more depth below in section 3.3.1.1. 
Another  common situation  which  could  result  in  double  non-taxation  is
concerning  hybrid  financial  instruments.  The  area  of  mismatch
arrangements  contains  issues  such  as  how  to  classify  equity  and  debts.
OECD presented a report on the area in 2012 and in the report OECD split
up different kinds of hybrid financial instrument and entities.64 My aim is
not to go deeper in to the different kinds of hybrid mismatch arrangements,
instead  I  will  do  a  general  introduction  and  specifically  focus  on  what
OECD  terms  as  hybrid  financial  instrument.  OECD  has  defined  hybrid
financial instruments as “instruments which are treated differently for tax
purposes in the countries involved, most prominently as debt in one country
and  as  equity  in  another  country.”65 A  hybrid  financial  instrument  is
designed to possess more than one legal form according to the contracting
states  domestic  law.  The  hybrid  financial  instrument  has  become  a
mechanism for international tax planning66 and is used to take an advantage
of  the  different  legal  framework  in  two  or  more  states.  Overall,  hybrid
mismatch arrangement raises a number of issues. OECD means that they
use of such instruments could distort competition, effect the economy and
fairness in trade.67
The  consequence  of  a  hybrid  financial  instrument  in  the  meaning  as  a
mechanism for tax planning, could for example result in double deductions.
62 OECD, report on the application of the OECD model tax convention to partnerships: 
issues in international taxation, 1999, page 36
63 OECD, report on the application of the OECD model tax convention to partnerships: 
issues in international taxation, 1999, page 10
64 For more information se  OECD, Report on hybrid mismatch arrangements: tax policy 
and compliance issues, 2012, page 7
65 OECD, Report on hybrid mismatch arrangements: tax policy and compliance issues, 
2012, page 7
66 Ramon Tomazela Santos, Tax treaty qualification of income derived from hybrid 
financial instrument, Bulletin for international taxation, 2013, vol 67 no. 10, section 1
67 OECD, Report on hybrid mismatch arrangements: tax policy and compliance issues, 
2012, page 11
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With  double  deduction  it  is  meant  that  the  hybrid  financial  instrument
created a deduction related to the same contractual obligation that is claimed
for  income tax  purposes  in  two different  countries.68 Double  deductions
could  occur  both  from  hybrid  financial  instruments  and  qualification
conflicts of partnerships.69
Another way to arrange it  is  to create a financial  instrument that gives a
deduction in one country, typically a deduction for interest expenses,  but
that  avoids  a  corresponding  inclusion  in  the  taxable  income  in  another
country.70
Some  states  have  implemented  specific  rules  against  hybrid  mismatch
arrangements.71 In relation to double tax conventions, in the protocol to the
convention  between  Belgium  and  Netherlands  for  example  contains  a
subject-to-tax clause that deals with double relief occurring from different
qualification  of  partnership.72 The  subject-to-tax  clause  in  the  protocol
provides the manner in which relief for double taxation is given in the case
of  hybrid  entities.73 Another  example  is  the  protocol  to  the  double  tax
convention  between  Germany  and  Luxembourg.  It  states  that  income
derived from a  hybrid  financial  instrument  paid  by  a  person resident  in
Germany is subject to withholding tax at source at 26.3% if the amounts
concerned have generated tax deductible expenses.74
General anti avoidance rules could work as tools against hybrid mismatches
but they are typically designed in a way that it needs to show that there is a
direct  link  between the  transaction  and  the  tax  avoidance.  In  practice  it
could be difficult to prove and general anti-avoidance rules although may
not always provide a comprehensive response to cases of unintended double
non-taxation through the use of hybrid mismatch arrangements.75
3.3 Methods to prevent double non-taxation
There  are  different  ways  to  tackle  double  non-taxation.  One  is  to  have
specific articles in the convention, for example a subject-to tax-clause. As
have been mention above, some states have introduced specific provisions
against a specific arrangement. Another way to tackle the problem is how to
68 OECD, Report on hybrid mismatch arrangements: tax policy and compliance issues, 
2012, page 7
69 Avery Jones, John F, Characterizion of other states partnerships for income tax, 
Bulletin for international taxation, 2002, page 320
70 OECD, Report on hybrid mismatch arrangements: tax policy and compliance issues, 
2012, page 7
71 OECD, Report on hybrid mismatch arrangements: tax policy and compliance issues, 
2012, page 14  
72 Avery Jones, John F, Characterizion of other states partnerships for income tax, 
Bulletin for international taxation, 2002, page 320
73 Avery Jones, John F, Characterizion of other states partnerships for income tax, 
Bulletin for international taxation, 2002, page 319
74 Ramon Tomazela Santos, Tax treaty qualification of income derived from hybrid 
financial instrument, Bulletin for international taxation, 2013, vol 67 no. 10, section 5
75 OECD, Report on hybrid mismatch arrangements: tax policy and compliance issues, 
2012, page 13
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interpret the convention between two states. Below, I will start with how
different interpretation of a double tax convention could solve a double non-
taxation situation. The other part will describe specific target provisions in
the double tax convention.
3.3.1 Interpretation of the articles in the OECD model tax
--------convention
This section describes how OECD means that double non-taxation could be
avoided through the convention itself.  
3.3.1.1 Interpretation of article 23
As has been mentioned above, the exemption method in itself could lead to
double non-taxation. In this section, I will start by discussing how OECD
suggest that double non-taxation could be resolved by the method articles in
the convention itself. When it follows from an allocation or a method article
that a state is precluded from taxing an income, the state shall exempt the
income regardless of whether the other state taxes the income or not under
domestic law. It is important to notice here that the method articles can not
be  a  tool  to  prevent  double  non-taxation  that  arises  from the  allocation
articles. The method articles only deal with double taxation that still exists
after the application of the allocation articles. If the allocation articles by
themselves result in double non-taxation, the method article can not prevent
double non-taxation situations and secure that the income will be taxed. 
OECD states that it is possible to avoid double non-taxation by interpreting
the meaning “may be taxed in the other contracting state.” Both article 23A
and 23B contains the meaning. In the commentary to article 23A and 23B
the OECD says that the phrase “in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention, may be taxed” is important when two contracting states classify
the same item of income differently.76 
Article 23A(1) OECD model can solve a conflict of qualification that occurs
from the contracting states domestic law. According to Lang, there is no
certainty over how article 23A(1) is actually suitable to prevent double non-
taxation in cases of conflict  of qualifications.77 One problem with article
23A(1) is that it assumes that the state of residence should be bound by the
qualification  of  the  source  state  only  if  the  qualification  results  from
national law in the source state.78 Vogels opinion is that the article does not
solve all the problems with conflict of qualification.79
According  to  OECD,  when  the  conflict  of  qualification  depends  on
76 Para. 32.2 of the commentary on article 23 OECD model tax convention
77 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 98
78 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 97
79 Vogel, Klas, Conflicts of qualification: the discussion is not finished, Bulletin for 
international taxation, 2003, page 41
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difference between in the contracting states domestic law, it could be solved
by interpreting article 23A(1).  In  paragraph 32.2 to  the  commentaries  to
article 23 says that: “The interpretation of the phrase in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention, may be taxed, which is used in both Articles,
is  particularly  important  when  dealing  with  cases  where  the  State  of
residence and the State of source classify the same item of income or capital
differently for purposes of the provisions of the Convention.”
In the year 2000 the OECD added a new paragraph to the exempt method.
Article 23A(4) is a complementary rule to article 23A(1) and is supposed to
cover those cases when two contracting states disagree on facts or in the
interpretation of the provisions in a double tax convention. The purpose of
this paragraph is to avoid double non taxation as a result of disagreements
between the State of residence and the State of source.80 When it concerns
fact in a case, it could for example be where the company has its resident.
Another conflict is when  the source state interprets the facts of a case in
such a way that an item of income falls under a provision that eliminates the
source  state's  right  to  tax  and  the  resident  state  adopts  a  different
interpretation  in  the  provision  in  the  DTC and  which  result  in  that  the
resident state has no right to tax the income.81 Article 23A(4) was added as
an explicit provision aiming to ensure that in certain qualifications conflicts
tax will at least be levied once82 when certain conflicts of qualification cases
result  in  double  non-taxation  as  a  consequence  of  the application  of  the
convention if the state of residence.83
In the doctrine there are different opinions regarding however article 23A(4)
is a subject-to-tax84 clause or a switch-over clause.85 Lang means that article
23A(4) should have an effect similar to a switch-over clause in cases where
conflict  of  qualification  results  in  double  non-taxation.86  According  to
Dahlberg,87 the article is not applicable when the income is not subject to
tax according to domestic law. Article 23A(4) only covers those conflicts of
qualification that could not be covered by article 23A(1). What’s interesting
to notice here is that those states that have a similar article to article 23A(4)
in their conventions, had already agreed and implemented such a paragraph
before the changes in the OECD model in 2000.88 It is interesting to notice
that the OECD only proposes this provision in connection to the exemption
method, even if it could be relevant for those states that apply the credit
80 OECD, report on the application of the OECD model tax convention to partnerships: 
issues in international taxation, 1999, page 60
81 Para. 56.1 of the commentary on article 23 OECD model tax convention
82 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 77
83 Para. 34.1 of the commentary on article 23 OECD model tax convention
84 Burgstaller, Eva & Schilcher, Michael, Subject-to-tax clauses in tax treaties, European 
taxation, 2004, page 267
85 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 122
86 Lang, Michael, Introduction to the law of double tax conventions, Linde, Amsterdam 
2010, page 122
87 Dahlberg, Mattias, Internationell beskattning, Studentliteratur, Lund 2012, page 292
88 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 100
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method.89 There is no similar article in the credit method.  The reason for
that  could  be  that  because  double  non-taxation  used  to  arise  from  the
conventions where the exempt method is  used,  OECD has  only found it
necessary to have methods against double non taxation in article 23A, there
is no similar provision in article 23B.  
If the double non-taxation is based on the interpretation of domestic law of
the source state, OECD art. 23A (4) is not applicable.90 OECD expressly
said  in  the  commentaries  to  the  paragraph that  the  article  23A(4)  is  not
applicable  when  the  source  state  may  tax  the  income  according  to  the
double tax convention but does not tax the income according to domestic
law.91  
3.3.1.2 Interpretation of article 4
For a state to be able to tax an income it must have the right to do so under
their domestic laws. In the OECD model, the criteria “liable to tax” is found
in  article  4.  The  article  does  not  give  any further  reference  to  when an
individual is considered to be liable to tax but refers instead to “any person
who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax..” It is therefore up to the
contracting states to decide when a natural person or legal person is liable to
tax.    
Double non-taxation could be solved by making sure that  the individual
actually pays tax on the income under the domestic laws of the contracting
state concerned. If no tax is paid, you could say that the individual is not
within the scope of the double tax convention.  The aim with double tax
convention is to prevent double taxation, so if no tax is actually paid in one
of the contracting states, there is no actual double taxation of the income.
OECD article 4 could be used to ensure single taxation, but it has to assume
that there is a resident individual only if tax is actually levied. A person who
is a resident but does not actually paid tax should fall outside the scope of
application of double tax convention.92
It  is  not  possible  for  a  taxpayer  to  claim  benefits  from  a  double  tax
convention in relation to a contracting state where no tax is imposed on the
taxpayer  by the  state's  domestic  law.  For  a  double tax convention to  be
applicable, it has to be a situation where two states tax the same taxpayer for
the same income.93 In the Swedish foreign tax credit act, it stands that the
taxpayer must have been subject to tax in the foreign state for the act to be
89 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 101
90 Lang, Michael, Introduction to the law of double tax conventions, Linde, Amsterdam 
2010, page 56
91 Para. 56.1 of the commentary on article 23 OECD model tax convention
92 Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 90
93 Kleist, David, Methods for elimination of double taxation under double tax treaties – 
with particular reference to the application of double tax treaties in Sweden, Iustus, 
Uppsla 2012, page 175
19
applicable.94 The  act  requires  subject  identity  for  tax  purpose  as  a  main
rule.95
In  a  case  from the  Swedish Supreme Court,  RÅ 1996 ref  84,  the  court
interpreted the term liable to tax as merely a requirement of formally being
subject to unlimited tax liability. In the case a company with residence in
Sweden owned shares in a company with residence in Luxembourg. The
company in Sweden received dividends from the shares in the company in
Luxembourg. According to the double tax convention between Sweden and
Luxembourg, it was Luxembourg that had the right to tax but according to
domestic  law  in  Luxembourg  the  income  was  tax  free.  According  to
Swedish domestic law the company should not pay any tax in Sweden for
the  received  dividend.  According  to  the  double  tax  convention,  it  was
Luxembourg that had the taxing right. The question for the court was if the
term “liable to tax” was fulfilled and if the Luxembourg company should be
treated as transparent for tax purposes under Swedish law. According to the
preparatory  work  to  the  double  tax  convention  between  Sweden  and
Luxembourg,  liable  to tax should mean that the tax subject was actually
paying tax in Sweden for be falling within the scope of the application of
the double tax convention.96 The Supreme Court did the opposite and found
the  double  tax  convention  applicable  thus  no  tax  was  actually  paid  in
Sweden. According to this case, as a result, the Swedish Supreme Court has
accepted  double  non-taxation  as  a  result  of  application  of  double  tax
convention.97 In  my  view,  double  non-taxation  could  be  avoided  by
implementing the double tax convention in a that way that the resident state
does not have to grant benefits under a convention if the current income is
not  subject  to  tax.  Tax has  to  be  paid in  both  contracting  states  for  the
convention to be applicable.  
The  definition of  resident  of  a  contracting state  refers  to  the concept  of
residence under domestic laws in a contracting state according to OECD
model  tax  convention.  The reference  to  persons  who are  “liable  to  tax”
under domestic law in a contracting state is a person that is considered liable
to comprehensive taxation even if  the Contracting State does not in fact
impose  tax.98 However,  some states  do not  consider  natural  persons  and
legal persons liable to tax if they are exempt from tax under domestic law.99
With reference to the Luxembourg case and the preparatory work to  the
convention described above, it is not definitely clear what is applicable in
the area for Sweden.
94 Foreign tax credit act chapter 2 para. 1
95 Kleist, David, Methods for elimination of double taxation under double tax treaties – 
with particular reference to the application of double tax treaties in Sweden, Iustus, 
Uppsla 2012, page 129
96 Prop. 1996/97:43 section 6
97 Hilling, Maria, National report – Sweden, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, 
double non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 659
98 Para. 8.6 of the commentary on article 4 OECD model tax convention
99 Para. 8.7 of the commentary on article 4 OECD model tax convention
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3.3.2. Specific provisions 
In this section I will  go through two kinds of special  provisions that are
aimed at targeting situations with double non-taxation. 
3.3.2.1 Switch-over clauses
In double tax conventions that are using the exempt method, a switch-over
clause  could  be  a  good  instrument  to  avoid  double  non-taxation.  With
switch-over clauses a state, that generally uses the exempt method under
certain  circumstances,  apply  the  credit  method instead  of  the  exemption
method.100 Switch-over  clauses  could  be  a  good  instrument  to  prevent
double non-taxation that arises from the exempt method, but a switch-over
clause is very restrictive for the taxpayers and could therefore be in conflict
with the fundamental freedoms within the EU.101
In  the  commentary  to  articles  23  A  and  B  in  the  OECD  model  tax
convention, it stands that when it comes to dividend and interest, states that
generally apply the exemption method may wish to apply the credit method
to  specific  items  instead.102 Especially,  in  those  cases  when the  state  of
residence chooses to exercise its right to tax interest and dividends.103 When
OECD introduced article 23A(4) in the year 2000, it was in the purpose to
give the resident state the right to switch from the exemption method to the
credit method when the interpretation of facts or of the provisions of the
double tax treaties led the source state to exempt or to imposing nominal
taxes.104 Article  23A(4)  in  the  OECD  model  tax  convention  stands  as
follow:
“The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to income derived or capital
owned by a  resident  of  a  Contracting State  where the  other Contracting
State applies the provisions of this Convention to exempt such income or
capital from tax or applies the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 10 or 11
to such income.”
Thus, it does not expressly say that the resident state is allowed to switch
method to the credit, the article at least provides for that article 23A(1) not
is applicable under certain circumstances. In the commentary to the article,
it stands that “the purpose of this paragraph is to avoid double non taxation
as a result of disagreements between the State of residence and the State of
source on the facts of a case or on the interpretation of the provisions of the
Convention.”105 OECD  does  not  give  any  further  referees  to  if  it  is  a
100 Arnold, Brian J, Tax treaties and tax avoidance: the 2003 revisions to the commentary 
to the OECD model, Bulletin for international taxation, 2004, page 257
101 European Commission, Summary report of the responses received on the public 
consultation on factual examples and possible way to tackle double non-taxation 
(TAXUD D1 D(2012)) page 16
102  Para. 47  of  the commentary on article 23 OECD model
103  Ramon Tomazela Santos, Tax treaty qualification of income derived from hybrid 
financial instrument, Bulletin for international taxation, 2013, vol 67 no. 10, section 4.2
104  Lang, Michael, Introduction to the law of double tax conventions, Linde, Amsterdam 
2010, page 122
105  Para. 56.1 of the commentary on article 23 OECD model tax convention
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subject-to-tax  clause  or  a  switch-over  clause,  but  since  OECD does  not
recommend  a  general  subject-to-tax  clause  in  the  conventions,106 it
presumes that this is more of a switch-over clause. At least it provides when
the exempt method not is applicable.   
3.3.2.2 Subject-to-tax clauses
Subject-to-tax clause means that a contracting state can reclaim its taxing
right when the other state does not make use of their taxing rights allocated
to them by the provision of a  convention.107 Contracting states conclude
subject-to-tax clauses in order to avoid double non-taxation. There are two
kinds of subject-to tax-clauses, the first one is the specific one that is found
in  the  allocation  articles  and  therefore  only  applies  to  certain  kinds  of
income. The second one is the general clause that is found in the method
articles and is therefore applicable to all kinds of income. A subject-to-tax
clause provides that the obligation of a contracting state to exempt income
shall  only apply if  the  income in question is  subject  to  tax in  the  other
contracting state.108 Some double tax conventions make the exemption or
reduce only if tax has actually been paid in the other contracting state.109
OECD does not provide for a general subject-to-tax clause and the OECD
model  tax  convention  does  not  contain  such  clause.  Thus,  them  not
recommend their member states to have a general subject-to-tax clause in
their conventions; they say that such provisions might be adopted for typical
conduit  situations.110 Since  the  OECD  model  tax  convention  does  not
provide  a  model  for  how  they  think  subject-to-tax  clause  should  be
designed, maybe it is why so many different kinds of subject-to-tax clauses
exist in double tax conventions. Burgstaller111 said that as long as there is a
lack  of  how  a  subject-to-tax  clause  should  look  like  and  missing  a
benchmark from OECD on how they should be designed they should be
avoided in double tax conventions. Of all the subject-to-tax clauses I have
gone through during my thesis, the one thing they have in common is that
they expressly provide that at least one of the contracting states should tax
the income. The income or the economic activity should be subject to tax. If
one  state  does  not  makes  use  of  the  taxing  right  under  the  double  tax
convention, the other state is free to tax the income instead.  
 
In recent years, states have agreed on rules within the scope of application
of the exempt method, according to which exemption in one state depends
on whether the other contracting state exercises the taxation right to it by the
106  Para. 15 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention
107  Scapa, Anna & Heine, Lars A, Avoidance of double non-taxation under the OECD 
model tax convention, Intertax, 2005 page 277
108  Kleist, David, Methods for elimination of double taxation under double tax treaties – 
with  particular reference to the application of double tax treaties in Sweden, Iustus, 
Uppsla 2012, page 176
109  Vogel, Klas, On double tax conventions, Kluwer law international. London 1997, page 
361
110  Para. 15 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention
111  Burgstaller, Eva & Schilcher, Michael, Subject-to-tax clauses in tax treaties, European 
taxation, 2004, page 276
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convention. These rules serve to ensure single taxation.112 Several double
tax conventions provide for various types of subject-to-tax clauses that serve
to avoid that the application of a double tax convention not led to double
non-taxation.113 A subject-to-tax clause may take many different forms and
some double tax conventions contain provisions that could be interpreted as
subject-to-tax clauses even if it is unclear if the avoidance of double non-
taxation  is  the  purpose  of  including  the  provisions  in  the  double  tax
convention.114 Some professors mean that OECD art 23A (4) could affect
operators as an subject-to-tax clause.115
A subject-to-tax  clause  is  regardless  of  the  reason  to  why  double-non
taxation arises. Instead, it secures that the income will be taxed in one of the
contracting  states.  The  clause  only  takes  into  account  the  double  non-
taxation effect and not the reasons beyond it with could be both positive and
negative.  OECD held that subject-to-tax clauses only refer to the domestic
tax  laws  of  a  state,  not  to  the  arrangement  that  have  given  rise  to  the
improper use of the convention.116 Even if a subject-to-tax clause does not
address to specific arrangement, it could still be an effective tool because it
secures that an income will be taxed.  Tax liability is based on the income
concept and within it counts both negative and compliments income. The
decisive factor for whether subject-to-tax clause is applicable is whether the
income is taxable, which includes both compliments as negative revenue.117
The main issue is when income must be considered to be taxed in that other
state.118 Lots  of  questions  follows,  for  example whether  it  should  be
required that tax is actually levied, paid or accrued or whether no taxation
due  to  for  example  tax  allowances  or  loss-set  offs  still  implies  that  the
income  is  considered  to  be  subject  to  taxation.119 Subject-to-tax  clauses
make the right to tax income in the source state depending on whether or not
such income is taxed in that state.
David  Kleist  raises  a  lot  of  issues  when  it  comes  to  a  subject-to-tax
clause.120 For example, if a state has a political reason to not tax the income,
is it then fair that the income become subject to tax in another state, when it
is the other state's intention not to tax the income? And when could you say
that the income has been taxed? Is an insignificant amount of tax on the
112  Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 86
113  Lang, Michael, General report, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double 
non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 88
114  Kleist, David, Methods for elimination of double taxation under double tax treaties – 
with  particular reference to the application of double tax treaties in Sweden, Iustus, 
Uppsla 2012, page 176
115  Holmes, Kevin, 58th IFA congress, 2004 summary of discussion on subject I and II, 
Bulletin for international taxation, 2004, page 535 
116  Para. 17 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention
117  Naumburg, Caroline, Subject to tax artiklar I DBA, Skattenytt, 2001, page 34
118  Lampe, Marc, General subject-to-tax clauses in recent tax treaties, European taxation 
1999, page 188
119  Scapa, Anna & Heine, Lars A, Avoidance of double non-taxation under the OECD 
model tax convention, Intertax, 2005 page 280
120  Kleist, David, Methods for elimination of double taxation under double tax treaties – 
with  particular reference to the application of double tax treaties in Sweden, Iustus, 
Uppsla 2012, page 177
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income sufficient to preclude the application of a subject-to-tax clause or is
there a minimum tax or tax rate that has to be applied? For example, is it
enough that tax is actually paid or should there be a minimum rate? For
example, could you still consider an income be subject to tax when the rate
is 4% and if the other state should have the right to tax, the tax rate have
been 20%? One solution to  that could be that in  the article  include that
taxation should be at least 15% of the income; otherwise the other state has
the right to tax. Furthermore, does the income have to be subject to tax at
the  regular  level  or  is  a  lower  tax  rate  accepted  without  triggering  the
subject-to-tax clause? Does the entire income have to be subject to tax or is
it sufficient that only part of the income is subject to tax? Or when double
non-taxation arises from carry forward losses? David Klesit121 means that
this kind of issues should be dealt with on a case by case basis and take as
their starting point the wording of the subject to tax clause concerned.
121  Kleist, David, Methods for elimination of double taxation under double tax treaties – 
with  particular reference to the application of double tax treaties in Sweden, Iustus, 
Uppsla 2012, page 178
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4. Swedish double tax 
---conventions 
4.1 Generally about Swedish double tax conventions 
In  the  1990s  the  Ministry  of  Finance  designed  a  Swedish  model  tax
convention which is used as a first discussion draft given by Sweden in the
tax treaty negotiations.122 In this chapter, I will make use of the version from
2007.  When Sweden  concludes  a  double  tax  convention  these  days,  the
credit method is used. As has been mentioned above, the credit method is
not a totally safe method to avoid double-non taxation even thought the risk
is lower than in the application of the exempt method. For notice, Sweden
has  a  few  double  tax  conventions  that  contain  the  exempt  method,  for
example  the  convention  with  Greece.123 Maria  Hilling  stands  that  the
problem with double non-taxation does not generally occur when Sweden is
the resident state because Sweden avoids double taxation by applying the
credit method.124
As has been presented above, according to the Swedish supreme courts it is
not necessary that the taxpayer actually pay tax to fall within the scope of
article  4  and  be  liable  to  tax  to  fall  within  the  scope  of  a  double  tax
convention. In Swedish legislation, it is the taxpayer that has to show that
tax has been paid in the other contracting state; it is the taxpayer that has the
burden  of  proof.125 This  is  regardless  of  which  method  is  used  in  the
convention.
4.2 Case law
Subject-to-tax clauses have  been disused in  two cases  from the  Swedish
Supreme Court. The two described cases below show the consequence if the
article not is applicable, that is, the result is double non-taxation. They also
show how the allocation articles by themselves could result in double non-
taxation.  Neither  of  the  current  double  tax  conventions  did  contain  the
exemption method, and even if the OECD model tax convention only  sees a
need in relation to the exemption method, this explains why it is important
to have a clause to avoid double non-taxation. 
  
The first case is RÅ 1987 ref 162. In this case the question was whether the
subject-to-tax  clause  in  the  convention  between  Sweden  and  United
Kingdom covered the current capital gains in the case. The court found that
122  Hilling, Maria, National report – Sweden, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 
89A, double non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 656
123 Article XXIII, para. 2 stands as follow “ Income from sources within Greece which in 
accordance with this Convention may be taxed in Greece either directly or by deduction, 
shall be exempt from Swedish tax...”
124  Hilling, Maria, National report – Sweden, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 
89A, double non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 674
125  Hilling, Maria,  National report – Sweden,  Cahiers de droit fiscal  international,  vol.
89A, double non taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 673
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the  subject-to-tax  clauses  did  not  include  the  current  capital  gains  and
Sweden was precluded from taxing the capital gains under the subject-to-tax
clause,  regardless  of  whether  the  capital  gain  had  been  remitted  to  the
United Kingdom.  Double  non-taxation occurred in  this  case  because  the
Untied kingdom did not tax the received capital  gains according to their
domestic law and it was United Kingdom that had the taxing right according
to the convention. 
The second one is from more recent years, case RÅ 2004 not 59. In this case
the  taxpayer  was  resident  in  Sweden.  The  taxpayer  owned  shares  in
companies that had their residence in Peru. The taxpayer intended to sell all
the shares and applied for  a  preliminary decision on whether the capital
gains would be taxable in Sweden. According to the article in the double tax
convention from 1966,126 capital  gains should only be taxed in that  state
where situated. The Peruvian company was registered in Peru and all their
activity  was  carried  out  in  Peru.  The  main  question  was  whether  non-
taxation in  Peru could lead to  taxation in  Sweden based on an assumed
subject-to-tax clause.  Under  the current  article,  “income from sources  in
Peru”, which is “subject to tax in Peru”, “shall be exempted from Swedish
tax”. Capital gains from the sale of shares of this kind were only taxable in
Peru. Although it was not taxed in Peru, Sweden had to exempt the capital
gains  from Swedish income tax.  The Swedish  Supreme Court  obviously
considered the article as a subject-to-tax clause and the provision could be
seen  as  a  generally  subject-to-tax  clause  on  the  basis  of  e  contradio
interpretation.127 The current article was not designed in the same way that
has  been  discussed  above  in  the  Swedish  model  tax  convention.  The
Supreme Courts decision was that the full taxing right belonged to Peru,
even thus  no tax was  paid in  Peru  cause  of  domestic  law in  Peru.  The
Supreme Court said the double tax convention between Sweden and Peru is
now cancelled128 and no new convention has been signed with Peru. 
4.3 Study of Swedish double tax conventions
In this  part  I  will  present my results  from what  I  found in the Swedish
double tax conventions.  Maria Hilling did a study 2004 on the extent on
subject-to-tax clauses in Swedish double tax conventions and it seems that
subject-to-tax  clauses  exist  more  often  in  convention  in  older
conventions.129 For my investigation I have focused my research to examine
to what extent a subject-to-tax clause exist  in double tax convention in that
meaning,  or  similar,  that  is  in  the  Swedish  model  for  tax  conventions.
Furthermore, I will look at conventions concluded after 2004. I will look at
what has happened in the area during the last ten years and since my version
of the Swedish model tax convention is from 2007 I assume that it is the
126 SFS 1968:745
127  Kleist, David, Methods for elimination of double taxation under double tax treaties – 
with particular reference to the application of double tax treaties in Sweden, Iustus, 
Uppsla 2012, page 177
128  Canceled 1st of January 2007, SFS 2006:642
129 For example Peru, United kingdom, Nordic countries. Se more in Hilling, Maria, 
National report – Sweden, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89A, double non 
taxation, Sdu fiscale & financeiele uitgevers, 2004, page 666 - 672
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Swedish interest to interpret subject-to -tax clause in their convention, or at
least a similar clause to that which is found in the version from 2007. In the
Swedish model from 2007, the article about capital contains a subject-to-tax
clause. Article 21(5) stands as follow:
“If, pursuant to paragraph 4 of this article, the right to tax capital held by an
individual who is a resident of a contracting state,  is vested only in that
state, such capital may be taxed in the other contracting state, where the net
capital is not subject to a general tax on net capital according to the laws of
the first mentioned state.” 
Between the 1st of January 2004 and 1st of May 2014, I have found 11 new
conventions concluded between Sweden and other states. Two of them, the
convention between Georgia from 2013 and the one with Nigeria from 2004
are not  in force.  Beyond that I  have found 13 new protocols to existing
conventions. The number of new double tax conventions could be compared
with the number of new exchanges  information agreements.  Since 2007,
Sweden has concluded 39 exchanges information agreements. 16 of these
exchange agreements are not in force. Most of the new protocols to existing
double tax conventions are about exchange information; see for example the
protocol to the convention between Sweden and Switzerland. Subject-to-tax
clauses  or  similar  articles  were  not  found  in  new  protocols  to  existing
Swedish double tax conventions.  
Subject-to-tax  clauses  are  found in  the  same context  as  there  are  in  the
Swedish model convention in double tax convention with Mauritius from
2011  and  Georgia  2013.130 The  earlier  double  tax  convention  between
Sweden and Mauritius  from 1993131 did not contain a subject-to-tax clause.
In the preparatory work to the convention between Sweden and Mauritius
there is nothing specific to why they have implemented the subject-to-tax
clause according to capital gains. Neither of the existing conventions and
the preparatory work describes why they have implemented a subject-to-tax
clause in the conventions.132  
A limitation on benefit clause is found in the double tax convention between
Sweden and Poland from 2004 and in the convention between Georgia and
Sweden  from  2013.  Furthermore,  exclusion  articles  are  found  in  some
double tax conventions conclude by Sweden. Exclusion articles are found in
the  double  tax  conventions  with  Jamaica,  Malta  and  Mauritius.  The
exclusion article in these cases is targeted to companies established in the
other state and include banking and insurance businesses which are subject
to  lower taxation compared to  other companies  in the other   contracting
state.133
Since  I  only  found  subject-to-tax  clauses  in  two  of  the  investigated
conventions, I consider if the reason to this could be that Sweden in all their
latest concluded conventions is referring to the foreign credit tax act instead
130  There is no information on when them will enter in force
131  SFS 1992:1195
132  Mauritius prop. 2011/12:168, Georgien prop. 2013/14:149
133  Dahlberg, Mattias, Internationell beskattning, Studentliteratur, Lund 2012, page 305 - 
306
27
of  using  the  method  articles  that  are  found  in  the  OECD  model  tax
convention. As has been mentioned above, the foreign credit tax act includes
a criterion that tax must have been paid in the other state. In the preparatory
work to the law it says that both positive and negative income should be
included.134 The preparatory work does not give any future reference; it only
refers to that right to get credit for tax required that the revenue should be
taxed in the foreign state due to that income under the laws of the state.135
By referring to domestic law and the criteria set out there, it can be assumed
that this is enough to avoid double taxation and double non-taxation since
tax actually must have been paid in the other state for the tax authorities to
grant credit for tax paid in the other contracting state. This still does not
solve  the  problem  when  double  non-taxation  arises  from  the  allocation
articles. In the 11 investigated double tax conventions I have found, a lot of
articles give the exclusive right to tax to one of the contracting states. The
double tax conventions and allocation articles that give the exclusive right to
tax an income is listed in annex I. 
The investigated double tax conventions listed in annex I show that there
still is a risk of double non-taxation even if Sweden in all the conventions
refers to foreign credit tax act. Only in the convention whit Mauritius and
Georgia there is a subject-to-clause, and it is only in relation to capital. As
we can notice,  there  is  a  lot  of  the  allocation  articles  in  the  mentioned
conventions that still could give rise to double non-taxation when the other
state  does  not  make  use  of  their  right  to  tax.  Since  my  aim  is  not  to
investigate how the foreign state will tax the income or not according to
domestic law, I only want to make the reader aware of the fact that there
could be allocation articles in the investigated conventions that could result
in double non-taxation. Depending on how the other contracting state taxes
the income, there could be loopholes for double non-taxation in the Swedish
double tax convention network. Why the Swedish Ministry of Finance only
have found it necessary to include a subject-to-clause for capital remains
unclear.    
134  Prop. 1985/86:131 page 19
135  Prop. 1985/86:131 page 20
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5. Conclusion
Above in chapter 4.3 I have presented my results of the investigation in the
Sweden double tax conventions from the last ten years. Surprisingly it is not
only  that  Sweden has  concluded  such  few new conventions  the  last  ten
years, but also that I only found subject-to-tax clauses in two double tax
conventions. Since the Swedish model tax conventions include a subject-to-
tax clause regarding to capital, one could assume that it is the intention from
Sweden's  Ministry  of  Finance  to  include  such  a  clause  in  Swedish
conventions. 
Overall,  subject-to-tax clauses were more frequently used in Swedish tax
conventions  in  versions  concluded  before  2004.  Sweden  does  not  use
general  subject-to-tax clause in  double  tax  conventions,  except  from the
Nordic convention.136 One reason to that could be that Sweden is generally
using the credit method to eliminate double taxation. Thus the credit method
minimise the risk for double non-taxation, it  is  not a tool against  hybrid
mismatches  and  conflict  of  qualification  cases  and  double  non-taxation
could still arise from the allocation articles. To prevent from double non-
taxation  that  occurs  from  hybrid  mismatches,  it  requires  specific  target
provisions or a  provision that secures that the economic activity at least
been taxed once.  In some of the Swedish double tax conventions I have
been  going  through,  I  have  found  limitation  of  benefits  clauses  in  two
double tax conventions.  These kind of rules only protects against  certain
economic activities. 
When it concerns double non-taxation in relation to double tax conventions,
you can split them in two groups. The first one is the situation of double
non-taxation that arise from hybrid mismatches and the second one is when
the convention give the right to tax to one of the contracting states and that
state does not tax the income because of domestic law. This is two situations
that  need to  be resolved separately.  When it  concerns  the  first  category,
hybrid mismatches, there is a need for special provisions to prevent that.
When it concerns the second category, double non-taxation that arise from
the allocation articles,  either  those articles could include  a  subject-to-tax
clause or that when no tax is paid in one state according to domestic tax law,
the double tax convention is not applicable since there is no actual double
tax situation.  
To avoid double non-taxation that arise from hybrid mismatches, I agree that
when  a  arrangement  is  common  use  between  two  contracting  state,  the
double  tax  convention  should  include  an  article  against  that  or,  from a
Swedish perspective, benefits from a convention should not be grant to a
taxpayer if not the criteria, liable to tax is fulfilled. There are doubts in the
doctrine on however subject-to-clauses prevent from advance tax planning
and tax avoidance and, not to forget, the OECD does not recommend their
members to have general subject-to-tax causes in their conventions. 
Even if OECD means that a person should not be entitled to treaty benefits
136  Article 26
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if the main purpose for entering into a particular transaction or arrangement
was to secure a more favourable tax position, it is a difficult situation when
it comes to proof of the abusive arrangement. With subject-to-tax clauses, it
is enough that the taxpayer can show that tax have been actually paid in the
other  contracting  state.  A  disadvantage,  however,  is  when  the  other
contracting state does not tax the income because of tax policy grounds.
I agree on the criticism from the Swedish general auditors that Sweden has
to be better to conclude new conventions and update older versions and I
cannot see why Sweden should not enter in to double tax conventions with
so called tax heavens. Dahlberg137 means that it is not Swedish tax policy to
enter  into  double tax  conventions  with  pure tax havens but  he  gives  no
further reference to why.
Double tax conventions open up doors for international tax planning and
Sweden should continue to work for eliminate these kinds of transactions. It
could be hard to renegotiate all conventions that are in force, but an easier
and faster way, is to deny a conventions application when no tax is actually
paid.  The term liable to tax should be given a much more weight  when
interpretation a tax convention. Since the  court case on the area is from
1996 and the global market have changed significantly since then, maybe it
is time to bring up a new court case which process the term liable to tax.   
The  guidelinging principle  in  the  commentary  to  article  1  in  the  OECD
model tax convention is week. The main purpose of a double tax convention
is according to OECD,138 is to avoid double taxation, work for exchanges of
goods and movement of capital and to prevent tax avoidance. What I am
missing  here  is  a  benchmark  from  the  OECD  what  means  with  tax
avoidance. Otherwise, when interpreting a double tax convention you could
say that tax planning that results in double non taxation falls outside the
scope of a double tax convention. This would be much easier to do if the
OECD explicitly said that in cases when double tax convention results in
double non-taxation, there is no actually double tax situation and that the
convention is not applicable.
It  should  be  every  states  interest  to  prevent  double  non taxation and to
implement special provisions against that. Lang139 on the other hands means
that because the object and purpose of double tax convention is to allocate
taxing rights, the possibility of double non-taxation should be accepted. I
agree that when double non-taxation occurs because of states tax policy, it
should be accepted. When it comes to unintended double non-taxation, the
work against that must continue. States general anti avoidance rule could be
effective, but it requires that the tax authority could show that it was the
taxpayers intention to avoid to pay tax and it could be hard when it comes to
regular tax planning, when such instrument are used, for example hybrid
entities. In these cases where there is a grey zone, it  should be easier to
insert specific provision in the double tax convention. A general subject-to-
tax provision could be a good tool to avoid double non-taxation but it seems
137  Dahlberg, Mattias, Internationell beskattning, Studentliteratur, Lund 2012, page 305
138 Para. 7 of the commentary on article 1 OECD model tax convention
139  Holmes, Kevin, 58th IFA congress, 2004 summary of discussion on subject I and II, 
Bulletin for international taxation, 2004, page 534
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that  these  kinds  of  articles  are  use  less  frequently  in  Swedish  tax
conventions. Another way to solve it could be like the way Germany and
Luxembourg have tackle it when it comes to hybrid instrument that have
been discussed above in section conflict of qualification and hybrids. This
does not eliminate all cases of double non-taxation, but at least it will be last
attractive to use these kinds of arrangements.
It could be easy to say that if one state does not tax the income, the other
contracting  state  can.  But,  as  has  been  discussing  above,  and  especially
when it concerns subject-to-tax clauses, the issues arise when there is an
intended double  non-taxation.  As have  been mention  above,  some states
used a low tax or no tax at all on items to attract foreign investors. It is
essential  to  consider  how  tax  systems  interact  with  each  other  when  a
double tax convention is concluded. This is relevant, not only from the point
of view to eliminate obstacles to cross border trade, it is also important from
that point of view to limit the cases of double non-taxation.140
All of the double tax conventions I have going thought include allocation
articles that give one of the contracting states the taxing right. If the term
“may be taxed” would be more frequently used in allocation articles, both
contracting states could use their taxing rights according to domestic law
and therefor, the remanning double taxation could be solved by the method
articles.  If  both  contracting  states  could  tax  the  income  according  to
domestic tax law and double tax convention, I think it will be  difficult to
achieve double non-taxation. That will have the same effect as a subject-to-
tax clause since at least one, and in some case both state will tax the income.
If  there is  a double tax situation after  that,  the next  step is  to eliminate
double taxation thought the method article. 
In all  the investigated Swedish double tax conventions there is a risk for
double  non-taxation  because  some  of  the  allocation  articles  give  the
exclusive right to tax to one of the contracting states. If no tax is actually
paid in Sweden, benefits from a convention should be denied since there is
no actual double taxation situation. 
A subject-to-tax clause means that a contracting state can reclaim its taxing
right  when the other  contracting  state  not  makes  use  of  the taxing right
allocated to the state by an article in a double tax convention. It seems that
effect of a subject-to-tax clause is most fulfilled when it is allocated in the
allocation article and not if it is found in the method article. The basic idea
whit a subject-to-tax clause is good, but instead of have a general subject-to-
tax clause in the method article, it seems better to have a own article that
stands the same and is applicable on the hole convention itself, regardless of
whatever stands in the method article. It could be a general anti abuse clause
to avoid double non-taxation and that secures that double non-taxation is
avoided and target non taxable income in domestic law. That secures that if
not one state makes use of their taxing right allocated to them, the other
state can reclaim the right to tax. 
140  OECD, Report on hybrid mismatch arrangements: tax policy and compliance issues, 
2012, page 25
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A subject-to-clause is effective is it found in a allocation article that gives
the exclusive right to tax to one state. General subject-to-tax clause does not
solve the situation with double non-taxation if there is no double taxation
from the beginning.  If  there is  no double taxation to  deal  whit  after  the
application  of  allocation  articles,  the  general  subject-to-tax  clause in  the
method article  never applies.  A subject-to-tax clause is  less  sensitive for
changes in domestic law.  Thus,  it  is  important  to design a subject-to-tax
clause so it is not in conflict with EU law and that income that are tax free
according to EU law secures. 
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Annex I
Convention Article Subject 
Swedish model tax 
convention
 
7 (1)
8 (1)
11 (1)
12 (1)
13 (3) and 13 (4)
14 (1-3)
18 (1) A and B
20 (1)
21 (3) and (4)
Business profits
Shipping and air transport
Interest 
Royalties
Capital gains 
Income from employment 
Government service 
Other income 
Capital* 
Chile 7 (1)
8 (1)
13 (1-3)
14 (1)
15 (1-3) 
18 (2)
19 (1) A and B
21 (1) 
Business profits 
Shipping and air transport 
Capital gains
Independent personal 
service 
Income from employment 
Pensions and alimony
Government service 
Other income 
Georgia ** 7 (1)
8 (1)
12 (1)
13 (3) and (5)
14
16 (3)
18 (1) A and B
20 (1)
21 (3 – 4)
Business profits 
Shipping and air transport
Royalties
Capital gains
Income from employment
Artistes and sportsmen
Government service
Other income
Capital*
Mauritius *** 7 (1)
8 (1) 
11 (1)
12 (1)
13 (3 – 4)
14 (1)
16 (3)
18 (1) A and B
20 (1)
21 (3 – 4)
Business profits 
Shipping and air transport
Interest
Royalties
Capital gains
Income from employment
Artistes and sportsmen
Government service
Other income
Capital* 
Nigeria 7 (1)
13 (3 – 4)
14 (1)
18 (1) A and B
21 (1) 
Business profits
Capital gains
Income from employment
Government service
Other income
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Poland** 7 (1)
8 (1)
11 (1) 
13 (3)
14 (1)
15 (1)
19 (1) A
21 (1)
Business profits
Shipping and air transport
Interest
Capital gains
Independent personal 
services
Dependent personal 
services
Government service
Other income 
Bermuda and others 5 (1-2)
9 (1) A and B
Income from Employment
Government Service
Cayman Islands 5 (1-2)
9 (1) A and B
Income from Employment
Government Service
British Virgin Islands
 
5 (1-2)
9 (1) A and B
Income from Employment
Government Service
Guernsey 5 (1-3)
8 (1) A and B
Income from Employment
Government Service
Isle of Man 5 (1-3)
9 (1) A and B
Income from Employment
Government Service
Jersey
 
5 (1-3)
9 (1) A and B
Income from Employment
Government Service
* The article includes a subject-to-tax clause
** The convention contains a limitation on benefits clause, Poland article 
----27, Georgia article 26 
*** The convention contains an exclusion article, article 1 (2)
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